

Information-Theoretic Proofs  
+ Cryptographic Commitments = Succinct Arguments

or "How to verifiably delegate computation?"

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Foundations Friday  
2023-5-26

# Verifiable Computation



e.g. ML algorithms

Client



e.g. large database

$f, x$



Server

$y \leftarrow f(x)$

Q: How can client know if indeed  $y = f(x)$ ?

A: Server can "prove" it!

## Goal

Design protocols such that

- 1) If  $y = f(x)$ , client will be convinced.
- 2) If  $y \neq f(x)$ , no efficient server can fool client.

More rigorously, want to show:

Efficient,  
convincing,  
cheating server



Efficient algorithm  
for solving computationally  
hard problems,  
e.g. factoring, discrete logarithm, LWE, ...


# Argument / Proof Systems

- NP Languages  $L_\lambda = \{ \text{stmt} : \exists \text{wit s.t. } (\text{stmt}, \text{wit}) \in R_\lambda \}$   
     $\uparrow$   
     $\lambda \in \mathbb{N} = \text{security / size parameter.}$
- Size of stmt =  $|\text{stmt}| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ .
- Argument System  $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, P, V)$  efficient algorithms
  - $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$   
     $\uparrow$  prover       $\uparrow$  verifier
  - $b \leftarrow \langle P(pp, \text{stmt}, \text{wit}), V(pp, \text{stmt}) \rangle$

# Typical Structure of $b \leftarrow \langle P(pp, stmt, wit), V(pp, stmt) \rangle$

$P(pp, stmt, wit)$

$V(pp, stmt)$



## Properties of Argument Systems I

- Completeness : If  $(\text{stmt}, \text{wit}) \in R_n$ , then

$$\Pr \left[ \langle P(\text{pp}, \text{stmt}, \text{wit}), V(\text{pp}, \text{stmt}) \rangle = 1 \right] \approx 1$$

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- Soundness : If  $\text{stmt} \notin L_\lambda$ , then  $\forall P^*, \text{wit}^*$

$$\Pr \left[ \langle P^*(\text{pp}, \text{stmt}, \text{wit}^*), V(\text{pp}, \text{stmt}) \rangle = 1 \right] \approx 0$$

Argument : The above holds  $\forall$  PPT  $P^*$ .

Proof : The above holds  $\forall$  unbounded  $P^*$

## Properties of Argument Systems II

- Succinctness:  $|\pi| \ll |stmt|$

Stronger variant:  $\text{Time}(V) \ll |stmt|$

after pre-processing  $stmt$ .

- Non-Interactiveness:  $t = 0$  or "1-move"

In this case, write  $\pi \leftarrow P(pp, stmt, z_{it})$

$b \leftarrow V(pp, stmt, \pi)$

# Fiat-Shamir Transformation

in the "random oracle model"

Theorem (informal):

$\Pi$



$FS(\Pi)$

Take-home:

Just consider these

- public-coin
- $\log(\lambda)$ -move
- complete
- "special-sound"
- Succinct


- non-interactive
- complete
- sound
- Succinct

Succinct  
Non-interactive  
ARGument  
(SNARG)



# Applications I Verifiable Computation

Client



Server

$$y \leftarrow f(x)$$

wit = all intermediate  
computation  
results

stmt = Consistency Check<sub>f,x,y</sub>

$$\pi \leftarrow P(pp, stmt, wit)$$

If  $V(pp, stmt, \pi) = 1$

then accept  $y$ .

## Applications II Incrementally Verifiable Computation

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{f_1} x_1 \xrightarrow{f_2} x_2 \xrightarrow{f_3} \dots \xrightarrow{f_t} x_t$$

- To verifiably compute  $f_i$ :

- Step ( $i, x_{i-1}, \pi_{i-1}$ )

If  $\pi_{i-1}$  proves that  $\exists (x_{i-2}, \pi_{i-2})$  s.t.

$$x_{i-1} = \text{Step}(i-1, x_{i-2}, \pi_{i-2})$$


then output  $x_i = f_i(x_{i-1})$

- Generate  $\pi_i$  proving that  $\exists (x_{i-1}, \pi_{i-1})$  s.t.

$$x_i = \text{Step}(i, x_{i-1}, \pi_{i-1})$$

# Applications III Aggregating Blockchain Transactions

Blockchain



- Fee to insert  $(tx_1, \dots, tx_{100000})$   
=  $100000$  Atto coin
- Fee to insert  $\pi : "(tx_1, \dots, tx_{100000}) \text{ are valid}"$   
=  $100$  Atto coin

# SNARK Construction: Compilation Paradigm

Cryptographic Commitments,  
e.g. vector commitments

Information-Theoretic  
Proofs  
e.g. PCP

Proof systems in  
idealised computation models

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{succinct} & & \text{SNARK} \\ \text{argument} & & \\ = \pi & \longleftrightarrow & FS(\pi) \end{array}$$

Note: Direct constructions of  
SNARK exist as well.

# Plan

- Example of IT proofs:

Probabilistically checkable proofs (PCP)

- Example of cryptographic commitments:

Vector commitments (VC)


- Kilian's succinct argument = PCP + VC

- More examples...

# Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCP)

IT

- Non-interactive proof systems in an idealised model



- PCP Theorem:  $\forall$  NP language,  $\exists$  PCP where

- $V$  uses  $O(\lg \lambda)$  randomness

- $V$  makes  $O(1)$  queries

- Soundness error =  $\frac{1}{2}$   $\xrightarrow{\lambda \text{ repetition}}$   $2^{-\lambda}$

# Vector Commitment

Crypt

PPT algorithms  $COM = (\text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Open}, \text{Verify})$

- $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  e.g.  $x \in \{0,1\}^{\ell}$
- $(\text{com}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Com}(pp, x)$
- $w \leftarrow \text{Open}(pp, \text{aux}, i)$   $i \in [\ell]$
- $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(pp, \text{com}, (i, y), w)$

Correctness:

$$\text{Verify}(pp, \text{com}, (i, x_i), w) = 1$$

Succinctness:

$$|\text{com}| \ll \ell$$


$$|w| \ll \ell$$

Position-Binding: No efficient adversary can find  
 $(\text{com}, i, w_0, w_1)$  s.t.

$$\text{Verify}(pp, \text{com}, (i, 0), w_0) = \text{Verify}(pp, \text{com}, (i, 1), w_1) = 1$$

# Merkle-Tree Commitment

$$\text{com} = X_{1:8} = H(X_{1:4}, X_{5:8})$$



$H$  collision-resistant  $\Rightarrow$  COM position-binding

$H$ : collision-resistant hash function

Opening of  $X_3$ :

root-to-leaf path

siblings

Verify:

$$\text{com} \stackrel{?}{=} X_{1:8}$$

$$X_{1:8} \stackrel{?}{=} H(X_{1:4}, X_{5:8})$$

$$X_{1:4} \stackrel{?}{=} H(X_{1:2}, X_{3:4})$$

$$X_{3:4} \stackrel{?}{=} H(X_3, X_4)$$



# Kilian's Succinct Argument $\Pi$

$$\underline{\Pi . P(pp, stmt, wit)}$$

$$\underline{\Pi . V(pp, stmt)}$$


$$\pi \leftarrow \text{PCP} . P(pp, stmt, wit)$$

$$|com| \ll |\pi|$$

$$(com, aux) \leftarrow \text{Com}(pp, \pi)$$



$$i_1, \dots, i_\lambda \leftarrow [L]$$



$$\forall j \in [\lambda],$$

$$w_j \leftarrow \text{Open}(pp, aux, i_j)$$

$$\left( \pi_{i_j}, w_j \right)_{j=1}^\lambda$$

$$\forall j \in [\lambda],$$

$$\text{Verify}(pp, com, (i_j, \pi_{i_j}), w_j)$$

Why sound? Intuition:

$P$  commits to  $\pi$  before seeing  
 $i_1, \dots, i_\lambda$

$$\begin{matrix} \nearrow & \nwarrow \\ \pi_{i_j} \in \{0,1\} & |w_j| \ll |\pi| \end{matrix}$$

## Why are we not satisfied?

PCP:

- Very high prover time — large poly( $|stmt|$ )
- Usually, PCPs support very "unexpressive" NP-complete languages  
⇒ High concrete overhead for NP reduction

Merkle-Tree Commitment:

- Opening size linear in # opened positions  
⇒ proof size =  $O(\lambda^2 \lg \lambda)$ .  
Can we do  $O(\lambda \lg \lambda)$ ?

# Subvector Commitment [L Malavolta 19]

"Strong root assumption"

$\Rightarrow$  position-binding

Open to  $n$  positions at the cost of 1.

## Setup ( $1^\lambda$ )

$$N \leftarrow \text{RSAGen}(1^\lambda)$$

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$$

$e_1, \dots, e_\ell$  primes

$$e = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} e_i$$

$$S_i = A^{e/e_i} \pmod{N}$$

$$\text{PP} = (N, A, (S_i, e_i)_{i=1}^{\ell})$$

## Com ( $\text{pp}, x \in \{0,1\}$ )

$$\text{Com} = C = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} S_i^{x_i} \pmod{N}$$

$$\text{aux} = x$$

## Open ( $\text{com}, \text{aux}, I \subseteq [\ell]$ )

$$J = [\ell] \setminus I, \quad e_J = \prod_{j \in J} e_j$$

$$w_I = \prod_{j \in J} A^{x_j \frac{e_J}{e_j}}$$

## Verify ( $\text{pp}, \text{com}, (I, x_I), w_I$ )

$$C \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{i \in I} S_i^{x_i} \cdot w_I^{e_I}$$

# Instantiations of Compilation Paradigm

Less powerful IT proofs



IT Proofs

PCP

Linear PCP

$O_\pi: \mathbb{F}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$   
linear function  
w/ coeff  $\pi$

Interactive Oracle Proofs (IOP)

$O_{\pi_1}, O_{\pi_2}, \dots, O_{\pi_t}$   
 $O_{\pi_i}(j) = \pi_{ij}$

Polynomial IOP

$O_{\pi_1}, \dots, O_{\pi_t}$   
 $O_{\pi_i}(x) = f_{\pi_i}(x),$   
 $f_{\pi_i} \in \mathbb{F}[X]$

Commitments

(S)VC

Functional Commitment for linear functions  
Commit to  $x \in \mathbb{F}^2$   
Open to  $L(x),$   
 $L$  linear

(S)VC

Polynomial Commitment

Commit to  $f \in \mathbb{F}[X]$   
Open to  $f(x)$

More powerful commitments



# Rank-1 Constraint Satisfiability (R1CS)

Convenient NP-complete language for building arguments.

$$\text{stmt} = (\underbrace{A, B, C, D}_{\text{matrices}}, \underbrace{y}_{\text{vector}}) \text{ over } \mathbb{F}$$

$$\text{wit} = x \text{ s.t.}$$

$$\begin{aligned} Ax \circ Bx &= Cx \\ Dx &= y \end{aligned}$$

Hadamard product

We will build  
a linear PCP  
for R1CS

# Polynomial Interpolation

Let  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell \in \mathbb{F}$  distinct evaluation points

$$f(x) = f_0 + f_1 X + \dots + f_{\ell-1} X^{\ell-1} \in \mathbb{F}[X]$$

Vandermonde matrix  $V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \alpha_1 & \dots & \alpha_1^{\ell-1} \\ 1 & \alpha_2 & \dots & \alpha_2^{\ell-1} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \alpha_\ell & \dots & \alpha_\ell^{\ell-1} \end{bmatrix}$

$$V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell} \begin{bmatrix} f_0 \\ f_1 \\ \vdots \\ f_{\ell-1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} f(\alpha_1) \\ f(\alpha_2) \\ \vdots \\ f(\alpha_\ell) \end{bmatrix}$$

$V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell}$  invertible

$\Rightarrow \forall \beta_1, \dots, \beta_\ell \in \mathbb{F}, \exists$  unique  $g \in \mathbb{F}[X],$   
 $\deg(g) \leq \ell-1, g(\alpha_i) = \beta_i \quad \forall i \in [\ell]$

$$\begin{bmatrix} g_0 \\ g_1 \\ \vdots \\ g_{\ell-1} \end{bmatrix} = V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \beta_1 \\ \beta_2 \\ \vdots \\ \beta_\ell \end{bmatrix}$$

# Linear PCP for R1CS

$$Ax \cdot Bx = Cx$$
$$Dx = y$$

Let  $f, g, h \in \mathbb{F}[x]$ ,  $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{2\ell} \in \mathbb{F}$ , s.t.

$\deg \underbrace{f}_{\leq \ell-1} \underbrace{g}_{\leq \ell-1}$

Verifier queries:

$$f(\alpha_i) = (Ax)_i \quad \forall i \in [2\ell]$$
$$g(\alpha_i) = (Bx)_i$$

$$h(\alpha_i) = \begin{cases} (Cx)_i, & i \in [2\ell] \\ f(\alpha_i) \cdot g(\alpha_i), & i \in [2\ell+1, 4\ell] \end{cases}$$

$$\textcircled{O}_\pi : \pi = \begin{bmatrix} x \\ h(\alpha_{2\ell+1}) \\ \vdots \\ h(\alpha_{4\ell}) \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\cdot q_A^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{\ell-1}] V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{2\ell}}^{-1} (A \mid 0)$$

$$\cdot q_B^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{\ell-1}] V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{2\ell}}^{-1} (B \mid 0)$$

$$\cdot q_C^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{\ell-1}] V_{\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{2\ell}}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} C \ 0 \\ 0 \ I_{2\ell} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\cdot q_D^T = [1 \ s \ \dots \ s^{\ell-1}] (D \mid 0)$$

where  $r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$  random

# Linear PCP for RICS

$$\textcircled{1} \pi : \pi = \begin{bmatrix} x \\ h(\alpha_{2l+1}) \\ \vdots \\ h(\alpha_{2l}) \end{bmatrix}$$

Verifier queries:

- $q_A^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{l-1}] V_{\alpha_1 \dots \alpha_l}^{-1} (A \mid 0)$
- $q_B^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{l-1}] V_{\alpha_1 \dots \alpha_l}^{-1} (B \mid 0)$
- $q_C^T = [1 \ r \ \dots \ r^{l-1}] V_{\alpha_1 \dots \alpha_{2l}}^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} C & 0 \\ 0 & I_l \end{bmatrix}$
- $q_D^T = [1 \ s \ \dots \ s^{l-1}] (\bar{D} \mid 0)$

where  $r, s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$  random

Response

↓

$$q_A^T \pi = r_A$$

$$q_B^T \pi = r_B$$

$$q_C^T \pi = r_C$$

$$q_D^T \pi = r_D$$

Expected

↓

$$f(r)$$

$$g(r)$$

$$h(r)$$

$$[1 \ s \ \dots \ s^{l-1}] y$$

Verifier checks:

$$\begin{cases} r_A \cdot r_B \stackrel{?}{=} r_C \\ r_D \stackrel{?}{=} [1 \ s \ \dots \ s^{l-1}] y \end{cases}$$



# Selected Questions I

- Compilation v.s. direct?

State-of-the-art : Polynomial IOP  
+ Polynomial commitment v.s. direct.

- (More) concretely efficient constructions?

e.g. round complexity, proof size, prover time,  
verifier time, preprocessing,  
expressiveness of supported NP language

Goal: Proving  $y = f(x)$  as efficient as computing  $f$

## Selected Questions II

- Design "proof-friendly" algorithms
  - e.g. use low-depth circuit, use low-degree polynomial, avoid or reduce control flow (e.g. if-then-else), more arithmetic, less combinatorics, ...
- Discover mathematical structures for constructing arguments
  - e.g. hinted and structured lattice problems

# Summary

- Introduction to argument systems
- Applications
- Compilation paradigm for SNARCs
- PCP, VC, Killian's argument
- Different instantiations of compilation
- Linear PCP for R1CS
- Research directions

Recent related work:

<https://ia.cr/2021/202>

<https://ia.cr/2022/941>

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